Tag Archive for 'opensips'

OpenSIPS battle: REGISTER requests vs permissions module

Sutuation: you have to check the source address of REGISTER messages, going to your OpenSIPS server and decide wether to allow them or to deny.

Use permissions module for this.

You can use it in two variants:

1. with OpenSIPS’ text config files register.allow and register.deny (similar to Unix hosts.allow and hosts.deny).
In this case you should use module’s function ‘allow_register

Example of blocking REGISTERs from 10.145.13.49 IP address:

register.deny file:

ALL : "^sip:.*10\.145\.13\.49"
ALL : "^sip:.*0*10\.145\.0*13\.0*49"   # this is to prevent bypassing
                                       # by the insertion of one or more '0' in the IP address

register.allow file is empty (allow everything except those in .deny file).

OpenSIPS script snippet:

	if ( is_method("REGISTER") ) {
		if (allow_register("register")) {
			save("location");
			exit;
		} else {
			sl_send_reply("403", "Forbidden registration from your IP v2");
			exit;
		}
	}

But this method has one big disadvantage – you need to restart OpenSIPS each time you edit register.allow/register.deny.
OpenSIPS ‘permissions’ module has a MI function ‘address_reload‘ but it reloads the table (see below), not the allow/deny files.
So, it’s more cool to use the second variant, go on reading!..

2. with DB table ‘address‘.
In this case you should use modules’ function ‘check_address

– register.allow and register.deny files are empty.
– add entries to ‘address’ table. In our case we’re using not real SQL DB but dbtext. So, this is how ‘/etc/opensips/dbtext/address’ file looks like:

voip-pbx-sbc ~ # cat /etc/opensips/dbtext/address 
id(int,auto) grp(int) ip(string) mask(int) port(int) proto(string) pattern(string,null) context_info(string,null)
1:0:10.84.2.0:24:0:any
2:0:10.145.13.5:32:0:any
3:0:10.145.13.49:32:0:any
4:0:10.145.14.0:24:0:any

WARNING: every time you add any new txt table (not sure about real SQL, but sure in case of using dbtext), do not forget to add it’s version to another txt-table ‘version’ (I think in case of real SQL it is done automatically, but with dbtext we have to do it manually):

voip-pbx-sbc ~ # cat /etc/opensips/dbtext/version 
table_name(string) table_version(int) 
dispatcher:8
load_balancer:2
address:5

Firstly, I haven’t done it, and that’s why OpenSIPS could not start and I had this message in the system log:

ERROR:core:db_check_table_version: invalid version 0 for table address found, expected 5

So, the script snippet with the ‘check_address’ function:

	if ( is_method("REGISTER") ) {

		if(check_address("0","$si","0","any")) {
			save("location");
			exit;
		} else {
			sl_send_reply("403", "Forbidden registration from your IP v2");
			exit;
		}

	}

And here’s the magic! You may add IP-addresses or subnets to your DB or dbtext file and then run a MI command ‘address_reload‘ without restarting your high-loaded OpenSIPS.

Now the policy is “if address is in the table – allow it, otherwise block”. Look at the images below.

IP is not in the table – REGISTER is forbidden:

IP has been added to dbtext table and table reloaded – registrations passed successfully:

You can also look the table’s contents with MI commands ‘opensipsctl fifo address_dump‘ and ‘opensipsctl fifo subnet_dump‘.

UPD: OpenSIPS core developer’s answer to my question http://lists.opensips.org/pipermail/users/2017-October/038169.html .

OpenSIPS: protecting from undesired requests

Original: http://lists.opensips.org/pipermail/users/2013-March/024887.html

A few suggestions (mostly already suggested by many guys in this thread, i
am only arranging their order to a secure setup), opensips log level should
be at least 2.

1. I usually filter out all known nasty users / attackers right in sanity
check section of default request route. My sanity check section structured
something like this,

a). check max forwards.
b). check message size.
c). check user-agent string against filter list, you can use
permissions module for this as well as hard code user-agents as Nick
suggested.

############################################
route {
if (!mf_process_maxfwd_header("10")) {
     sl_send_reply("483","Too Many Hops");
     exit;
};

if (msg:len > max_len) {
     sl_send_reply("513","Message Too Big");
     exit;
};

if ($ua =~ "friendly-scanner") {
     xlog("L_WARN", "[$pr:$fU@$si:$sp]: Rejecting '$rm' request from bogus device '$ua' \n");
     exit;
};
...
#####################################

2. Then in authentication section, i make sure to authenticate both INVITE
and REGISTER requests, you check ret-code for both www-authorize and
proxy-authorize methods and if it is -1 or -2 then do xlog to print log on
intruder which is picked by fail2ban to block the user (make sure text
pattern in your xlog matches failregex in fail2ban! ).

Negative code meanings: http://www.opensips.org/html/docs/modules/2.1.x/auth_db.html#id293676

#####################################
...
if (!www_authorize("","subscriber")) {

     switch ($retcode) {
     case -1:
          xlog("L_NOTICE", "[$pr:$fU@$si:$sp]: Auth error for '$tU' from '$si',
          peer not found - User-Agent: '$ua' \n");
          break;
     case -2:
          xlog("L_NOTICE", "[$pr:$fU@$si:$sp]: Auth error for '$tU' from '$si',
          wrongpassword - User-Agent: '$ua' \n");
          break;
          ...
     };

www_challenge("", "1");
exit;
};
...
#######################################